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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 In this putative class action, Plaintiff-Appellant Andrew 
Panico, who resides outside of the state of Delaware but signed 
a contract with a choice-of-law provision specifying 
application of Delaware state law, asserts that Defendant-
Appellee Portfolio Recovery Associates (“PRA”) violated the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”) by suing to collect 
debts after the applicable Delaware statute of limitations had 
run.  The District Court granted Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, after finding that a Delaware tolling 
statute served to prevent the Delaware statute of limitations 
from running as to a party residing outside the state of 
Delaware through the pendency of the credit relationship, 
default, collections attempts, and ensuing litigation.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will reverse the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment and remand the case for further 
consideration. 
 
I1 
 Panico is a resident of the state of New Jersey, who, by 
early 2010, allegedly incurred substantial debt on a credit card 
account with MBNA America Bank (“MBNA”).  As it arose 
from spending for personal or household purposes, Panico’s 
obligation qualifies as “debt” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) of 
the FDCPA.  On June 18, 2010, MBNA regarded Panico as 
delinquent on his then-outstanding balance.  MBNA assigned 
the rights to the debt to Appellee PRA, a debt collector.    
                                              
1  For purposes of summary judgment in the District 
Court, the parties stipulated to all of the facts as related here. 
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Although PRA engaged in attempts to collect the debt, it did 
not succeed. 
 
 On October 20, 2014—more than three but fewer than 
six years after the cause of action for debt collection accrued—
PRA sued Panico in New Jersey Superior Court to recover the 
balance.  New Jersey’s relevant statute of limitations barred 
collection of such debts after six years; Delaware’s statute of 
limitations, by contrast, proscribed collection of such debts 
after only three years.  The credit agreement governing the 
relationship between Panico and MBNA provided for 
application of “the laws of the State of Delaware, without 
regard to its conflict of laws principles, and by any applicable 
federal laws.”  App. 54.  Panico moved for summary judgment, 
on the ground that the collections action was time-barred.  
Rather than litigate the issue of whether Delaware’s tolling 
statute applied to stop the state’s three year statute of 
limitations from running as to defendants residing outside the 
state, PRA agreed to a stipulated dismissal. 
 
 In March 2015, Panico filed this putative class action in 
the District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The class 
action alleged violations of the FDCPA and the NJCFA, on the 
grounds that PRA had sought to collect on a time-barred debt.  
PRA moved for summary judgment on the basis that the debt 
it had sought to collect was not time-barred.  That motion 
presented squarely the issue of whether the Delaware tolling 
statute would apply to abrogate the statute of limitations that 
would otherwise have barred the collection of the underlying 
debt.  The parties agreed to address that issue before addressing 
class certification, and ultimately, the District Court granted 
PRA’s motion for summary judgment on September 14, 2016.  
Panico timely appealed. 
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II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(d)—the relevant section of the FDCPA—and 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a 
final decision of a District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of a District Court’s grant of summary judgment is 
plenary.  NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435, 440 
(3d Cir. 2016).  Summary judgment is appropriate when “the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
 
III 
 The parties agree, for the purpose of this appeal, that 
under New Jersey conflict-of-law rules, Delaware law governs 
this action.2  They disagree, however, as to the interaction of 
Delaware’s statute of limitations and statutory tolling 
provision.  Delaware’s statute of limitations for actions to 
recover debts based on a credit relationship between two 
parties bars filing against defendants “after the expiration of 
3 years from the accruing of the cause of such action.”  Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106a.  PRA’s suit, filed in October of 
                                              
2  PRA’s memorandum of law in support of its motion 
for summary judgment before the District Court acknowledged 
that, “[f]or the purposes of this motion only, PRA will presume 
that [Panico]’s allegation as to the applicable state law and 
statute of limitation is correct.” Supp. App. 1. PRA confirmed 
at oral argument that it agreed to so presume, rather than 
litigate the issue of conflict of laws, based on PRA’s firm belief 
that it would prevail even if Delaware law applies. 
 6 
 
2014 to collect an alleged debt regarded as delinquent as of 
June 2010, falls outside the applicable statute of limitations.  
PRA asserts, however, that the Delaware tolling statute applies 
to stop the statute of limitations from running because Panico 
resided outside of Delaware during the entirety of the credit 
relationship, the debt collection efforts, and the period of time 
preceding the commencement of litigation.  The Delaware 
tolling statute provides that:  
 
If at the time when a cause of action accrues 
against any person, such person is out of the 
State, the action may be commenced, within the 
time limited therefor in this chapter, after such 
person comes into the State in such manner that 
by reasonable diligence, such person may be 
served with process. If, after a cause of action 
shall have accrued against any person, such 
person departs from and resides or remains out 
of the State, the time of such person’s absence 
until such person shall have returned into the 
State in the manner provided in this section, shall 
not be taken as any part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8117. 
 Our role is to apply the law of the appropriate 
jurisdiction.  City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 994 
F.2d 112, 123 (3d Cir. 1993).  Contrary to PRA’s argument, 
Delaware courts have interpreted the state’s tolling statute not 
to abrogate the statute of limitations against defendants within 
reach of the state’s long-arm statute.  See, e.g., Hurwitch v. 
Adams, 155 A.2d 591 (Del. 1959); Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 
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A.2d 1105, 1114 (Del. 1988).  In Hurwitch, the Delaware 
Supreme Court noted that applying the tolling statute literally 
“would result in the abolition of the defense of statutes of 
limitations in actions involving non-residents.”  Hurwitch, 155 
A.2d at 594.  Rather than countenance such a result, the Court 
held that the tolling statute “has no tolling effect . . . when the 
defendant in the suit is subject to personal or other service to 
compel his appearance.”3  Id. at 593.  As such, the limitations 
period “runs continuously without interruption when there is 
available to the plaintiffs throughout the period an acceptable 
means of bringing the defendant into court.”  Id. at 594 
(citation omitted).  Within Delaware, Hurwitch has guided 
state courts to find that statutory tolling does not stop the 
statute of limitations from running as to defendants who would 
have been amenable to service.  See, e.g., Sternberg, 550 A.2d 
at 1114 (confirming, in the context of an Ohio corporation, that 
there “is no tolling effect on the applicable statute of limitations 
in any action when the nonresident defendant in the suit is 
subject to substituted service of process.”).   
 
 PRA points to Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil 
Yanbu Petrochemical Co., where the Delaware Supreme Court 
applied statutory tolling to an out-of-state entity so as to 
abrogate an otherwise-applicable statute of limitations.  866 
A.2d 1 (Del. 2003).  But Saudi Basic only underscores that the 
lynchpin of the analysis is whether the defendant could 
reasonably be served.  In that case, the court held that “the 
purpose and effect of [the tolling statute] is to toll the statute of 
                                              
3  Since Hurwitch, the tolling statute has been re-
codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8117, as cited above.  At 
the time, the tolling statute was codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 
10, § 8116. 
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limitations as to defendants who, at the time the action accrues, 
are outside the state and are not otherwise subject to service of 
process in the state.”  Id. at 18.  In those circumstances, the 
statute of limitations is tolled until the defendant “becomes 
amenable to service of process.”  Id.  The defendant in Saudi 
Basic was a corporation based in Saudi Arabia, and could not 
have been served even under Delaware’s long-arm statute.4  
There is no dispute that the tolling statute applies in such a 
case—but serving a resident of New Jersey differs 
substantially from serving a Saudi Arabian corporation.  
Indeed, PRA had no trouble serving Panico when it sued him 
in New Jersey state court.5 
 
The Hurwitch line of cases has guided out-of-state 
courts in answering the question that Delaware courts cannot 
sit in a posture to answer: whether Delaware’s tolling statute 
                                              
4  That statute provides that “[a]ny person . . . submits 
to the jurisdiction of the Delaware courts” when he or she, 
among other things, “[t]ransacts any business . . . in the State.”  
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(b)-(c).  The same statute 
provides for “service of process outside the State” in a variety 
of ways—including personal delivery as prescribed for service 
within Delaware, or personal delivery as prescribed for service 
within the jurisdiction of the person to be served—so long as it 
is “reasonably calculated to give actual notice.”  Id. § 3104(d). 
 
5  The parties stipulated at the summary judgment stage 
that Plaintiff was not amenable to service of process in 
Delaware, App. 47; however, while it may have been true that 
Plaintiff was not subject to process while physically located in 
Delaware, it is beyond peradventure that Plaintiff was subject 
to service of process, even out of state. 
 9 
 
stops the Delaware statute of limitations from running in suits 
commenced, as here, in out-of-state jurisdictions against out-
of-state parties based on agreements governed by Delaware 
law.  Out-of-state courts have uniformly declined to apply the 
Delaware tolling provision to stop the statute of limitations 
from running in perpetuity.  E.g., Portfolio Recovery Assoc., 
LLC v. King, 927 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (N.Y. 2010) (concluding 
the Delaware tolling provision did not extend the Delaware 
statute of limitations in an action by the same party in this suit 
to collect a debt against a non-resident of Delaware); 
McCorriston v. L.W.T., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276 (M.D. 
Fla. 2008) (finding that an argument that the Delaware tolling 
statute stopped the Delaware statute of limitations from 
running, “although wrong . . . was a good faith mistake”); 
Resurgence Fin., LLC v. Chambers, 173 Cal.App. 4th Supp. 1, 
6 (2009) (finding that the Delaware tolling statute “can be most 
reasonably read to apply only to actions that are actually filed 
in a Delaware court or actions that could have been filed in a 
Delaware court”).6   
 
                                              
6  See also Izquierdo v. Easy Loans Corp., No. 2:13-cv-
1032-MMD-VCF, 2014 WL 2803285, *7 (D. Nev. June 19, 
2014) (finding that the Delaware tolling statute only stopped 
the Delaware statute of limitations from running when the 
action was or could have been filed in a Delaware court); 
Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. First Cal. Mortg. Corp., No. 
13-cv-02113-CMA-KMT, 2014 WL 1715120, *4 (D. Colo. 
April 30, 2014) (rejecting the argument that Delaware’s tolling 
statute stops the statute of limitations from running when such 
application would result in “an absurd result: tolling the 
limitations period in perpetuity”). 
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The only courts that have accepted arguments 
analogous to PRA’s here—that the Delaware tolling statute 
stops the Delaware statute of limitations from running—have 
done so in contexts where doing so would not create “the 
‘absurd’ result of a claim surviving in perpetuity” or result in 
“the abolition of a statute of limitations affirmative defense.”  
Unifund CCR Partners v. Sunde, 260 P.3d 915, 925 (Wash. 
App. 2011); see also CACV of Colorado, LLC v. Stevens, 274 
P.3d 859 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).  In both of those cases, the courts 
applied the forum state’s limitations period to preserve the 
availability of a statute of limitations defense.  Unifund, 260 
P.3d at 915 (applying Washington’s limitations period); 
CACV, 274 P.3d at 859 (applying Oregon’s limitations period).  
No court, then, has accepted the argument that PRA makes 
here—that the Delaware tolling statute may stop the Delaware 
statute of limitations from running in perpetuity as to the many 
out-of-state consumers who sign contracts of adhesion with 
Delaware corporations without ever setting foot in the state. 
 
We believe those courts have the correct reading of the 
interaction of the Delaware tolling and limitations statutes as 
to such out-of-state defendants.  For decades, the Delaware 
tolling statute has abrogated the State’s statute of limitations 
only as to defendants not otherwise subject to service of 
process.  We have heard no evidence that the Delaware 
legislature intended to export the state’s tolling statute into out-
of-state forums so as to substantially limit the application of 
the Delaware statute of limitations.  Departing from that 
precedent would also have the effect of eliminating the 
protections of the FDCPA, NJCFA, and other state statutes 
intended to protect debtors and regulate debt collection.  We 
see no reason to predict that the Delaware Supreme Court 
would reject the Hurwitch line of cases in contravention of 
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federal and out-of-state consumer protection law in a manner 
that would result in indefinite tolling of the state statute of 
limitations.  Accordingly, we decline to do so.  
 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the 
District Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
